Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical
Legal Studies and The Law of Race

Relations1

GERALD TORRES*

In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should
consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity
from the truth of that conception; and the sum of those consequences will
constitute the entire meaning of the conception.'
Law, . . . is local knowledge; local not just as to place, time, class, and

variety of issue, but as to accent - vernacular characterizations of what
happens connected to vernacular imagining of what can happen.3
Accordingly, the "problem" is not language .

.

. the task is to face the

inevitability of politics in the fullest sense, to recognize the extent to which
we are inevitably thrown into social struggle as either reproducers or resisters of the reigning order and to face the prospect that we have no guarantees that any specific course is the correct one. We inevitably align with one
group or another; there is no place free from the play of social practice,
where we could flee from the existential condition that we create our world
on the basis of a prior context that we can never fully grasp.'
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; A.B., 1974, Stanford
University; J.D. 1977, Yale University; LL.M. 1980, University of Michigan. While
many people have contributed to this essay, I would especially like to thank Rob
Williams, Richard Delgado, Don Brewster, Kathryn Milun, Mary Coombs, Kevin Paul,
Melissa Johnson, and Frances Nash for their helpful insights and critical comments.
1. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561 (1984) [hereinafter Delgado, The ImperialScholar];
Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987) for an interesting discussion regarding

the impact of liberal and radical scholarship on legal thinking about race and criticism of
the inbreeding among non-minority commentators; see also Crenshaw, Race, Reform
and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
2. Peirce, A Definition of Pragmaticand Pragmatism,reprinted in H. THAYER,
PRAGMATISM: THE CLASSIC WRITINGS 53 (1970).
3. C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 215 (1983).
4. Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1290

(1985). This passage comes at the end of a very long essay on the metaphysical founda1043

At least initially, one of the major goals of the Conference on
Critical Legal Studies 5 was to integrate academic and theoretical
work with the concrete radical or progressive practice of law.' Critical legal theory sought to organize its "research program and its
conceptual framework with an eye to the aims and activities of those
oppositional social movements with which it has a partisan though
not uncritical identification." 7 Accordingly, the questions posed by
the theory were based on the self-conscious identification with the
movements or the interests expressed in those movements. Such an
approach presumes, of course, that the attack by Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) on conventional legal scholarship is linked in some
material way to the theoretical needs of progressive practitioners. It

also presumes that law remains (or has become) a central avenue of
radical political practice. Holding in abeyance any inquiry into the
content of the first presumption, it seems clear that one of the foun-

dations for the second belief has been the success of the civil rights
movement in changing the face of American society and culture, as
well as its use of law as a primary instrument in that change.'
Despite, or perhaps because of, the identification of CLS with progressive currents in the law, it has become one of the most roundly
denounced movements in modern legal theory. It is reviled principally because it is thought to be malignant. Its detractors reel in the
face of its corrosive message: the destruction of law as a source of
social certainty. That the law might exist merely as another source
of social irrationality9 is thought to be an expression of nihilism 10
tions of American law. The assertions in this concluding paragraph are problematic. The
reader is referred to the entire article in order to appreciate both the philosophical context within which the comments are made and the shadings with which they must be
viewed. A full reading will likely resolve some of the apparent contradictions in the
paragraph.
5. The Conference on Critical Legal Studies, founded in 1977, is a loose affiliation of law teachers and practitioners who see themselves as aligned in opposition both to
the traditional methods of legal research and the political ends of traditional law practice. They have defined themselves in terms of what and how they study and in terms of
those they serve.
6. See THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982);
Calmore, Exploring the Significance of Race and Class in Representing the Black Poor,
61 OR. L. REV. 201 (1982); Gabel & Harris, Building Power and Breaking Inages:
CriticalLegal Theory and the Practiceof Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369
(1982-83).
7. Fraser, What's Critical About Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and
Gender, 35 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 97 (1985).
8. The author does not wish to slight the contributions of feminist theory and
practice to this belief. See, e.g., C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN (1979).

9. Fear exists
law to mean anything
both to critical theory
10. Carrington,
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that the deconstructive theoretical tendencies in CLS allow the
through the application of radical indeterminancy, which is tied
and to structuralism.
Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
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and a lesson too dangerous to loose in the law schools. 1 Attacks on
the CLS movement and its perceived agenda12 have come from the
left13 as well as the right. 4 The left attacks CLS because its insights
yield no progressive political program; the right attacks CLS for its
incoherence, nihilism, and leftist sympathies. Yet CLS is perceived

as the only substantial, although at times abstract and even incoher-

ent, alternative to Law and Economics approaches. 5
This essay will examine the meaning and content of CLS, focusing
on the struggle for racial equality. It will suggest ways in which un-

derstanding the relationship between law and culture can enable,
both academics and practitioners, to construct theoretical foundations for the next generation of race relations law. One thesis of this
essay is that understanding how the law of race relations has
emerged and changed over the past twenty-five years is possible only
by understanding how the dominant culture has accommodated itself
to the changed legal landscape. Central to this inquiry is understanding American cultural pluralism as an expression of cultural domination and subordination within the context of race relations law.
What is currently considered generally acceptable interracial behavior reflects a norm of greater tolerance of racial and ethnic diversity than existed in the past. 6 At the same time, this increased toler11. Id. Critics such as Carrington see in the theoretical agenda of CLS the destruction of law as a distinct intellectual discipline necessarily resulting in the destruction
of the institutional functions of both the law and lawyering.
12. As the Conference of Critical Legal Studies indicates, it is improper to speak
of a unified CLS "agenda." See Tushnet, Perspectives on Critical Legal Studies, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 239 (1985). Yet even the Conference admits the existence of identifiable intellectual and political tendencies among critical legal scholars.
13. See Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986);
Cole, Getting There: Reflections on TrashingFrom Feminist Jurisprudenceand Critical
Theory, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 59 (1986).
14. The author hesitates to use the designations "left" and "right" because it is
not clear that these terms have retained any of their traditional meaning in American
politics. Suffice to say that the "right" appears aligned with the existing agenda of the
Reagan-led Republican party, see, e.g., Two More Years: A Final Reagan Agenda, 19
THE Am. SPECTATOR 14 (1986), while the "left" consists of those groups in opposition to
the "Reagan vision," see generally IN THESE TIMES and SOCIALIST REVIEW. It goes without saying that there are many conflicting subgroups within these two broad categories.
The self-styled "Reagan Revolution" has altered the terms of policy debate to such an
extent that the mild-left characterizations which gained currency in the late 1960's and

early 1970's have been delegitimized. The marginalization of the "left" has taken on
aspects of both a holy war and a parlor game.
15. See, e.g., Bork, Battle for the Law Schools, 38 NAT'L REV. 44 (1986); Clark,
Philosophies at War in Law Schools, INSIGHT, Sept. 29, 1986, at 52; Reidinger, Civil
War in the Ivy, 72 A.B.A. J. 64 (1988).
16. See Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and
1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1985). The recent racially motivated attacks in Howard
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ance has not been rooted in a wholesale redistribution of material
social resources. 17 The continuing struggle over the justifications for
such a redistribution forms the core of the theoretical difficulties in
the modern law of race relations. 8 Perhaps the recent decline in the
fashionableness of the legal fight against domestic racism is due, in
part, to the considerable difficulty of making plausible arguments for
the restribution of social resources within the framework of extant
law and ideology.'
The transformation in legally acceptable race-related conduct is a
crucial element in the alteration of acceptable social behavior. This
Beach, New York and Forsythe County, Georgia, as well as ex-Arizona Governor Edwin
Mecham's attempt to rescind Martin Luther King Day, highlight the fact that while
much has changed, profound racial tolerance is not yet permanently embedded among
the core elements of "the American character." While other local and regional cultural
and economic factors were at work in each of these instances, none of these factors blunts
the racism apparent in each situation.
17. See Jencks, Discrimination and Thomas Sowell (Book Review), Mar. 3,
1983, at 33 (especially the discussion of black income as compared to that of whites).
Recent studies have demonstrated that the class expression of racial discrimination is
made more stark when one looks to the distribution of wealth between races, rather than
merely comparing differences in income. See Calmore, supra note 6.
18. See Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C.L. REV. 303, 341-46 (1986) (discussing the economic, legal, and cultural implications of the current affirmative action debate). This formulation comes dangerously close
to "mere economic determinism." The interaction of law, economics, and culture, even in
a relatively homogenous society, is extremely complex. See, e.g., the discussion of that
interaction in D. HAY, P. LINEBACH, J. RULE, E. THOMPSON, C. WINSLoW, ALBION'S
FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1975).
19.
The concept of ideology is one of the most original and comprehensive concepts
Marx introduced. It is also one of the most complex and most obscure, though
the term is widely employed today. To clarify it, we shall begin with a few
preliminary considerations ....
a. It is well known that the term "ideology" originated with a philosophical
school (empiricist and sensationalist, with a tendency to materialism) which
enjoyed considerable influence in France at the close of the eighteenth and the
beginning of the nineteenth century. According to the philosophers of this
school, . . . there is a science of ideas, i.e., of abstract concepts, which studies
their genesis and can reconstruct it in full starting from sensations (a conception that goes back to Condillac). This science was called "ideology" and the
philosophers who practiced it called themselves "ideologists" (ideologues).
Marx transformed the meaning of the term - or, more accurately, he and
Engels gave their approval to a transformation in meaning which the term underwent once the school of ideologues died out. The term now became a pejorative one. Instead of denoting a theory, it came to denote a phenomenon the
theory accountedfor. This phenomenon now took on entirely different dimen-

sions. As interpreted by the French ideologists, ideology was limited to accounting for individual representatives by a causal psychology. To Marx and
Engels, the phenomenon under study became a collection of representatives
characteristic of a given epoch and society.
Lefebvre, The Sociology of Marx, reprintedin SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER
IN THE STUDY OF SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS 254-55 (J. Dolgin, D. Kemnitzer, D. Schneider eds. 1977) (emphasis added). See also K. Harvey, Law, Science and Economics:
Themes in the Dominant Ideology (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript on file with the
author).
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essay argues that critical legal theory ought to be constructing a per-

suasive articulation of the legal foundations and justifications for a
form of cultural pluralism. This cultural pluralism must escape the
ethnocentric assumptions of anglo cultural superiority and challenge
the legitimacy of the conventional domination/subordination model
of race relations. Dominant cultural imperatives have transformed
the meaning of the legal changes won by the civil rights movement
and have blunted their progressive impulse. Critical legal theory
should explore the nature of the broad social accommodations that
have worked that transformation. Understanding the meaning of the

legal changes that have occurred will inform our understanding of
the law. 20 It will illuminate for us the ways in which the law has
enabled racial and ethnic minorities to create a new sense of both

their place in the dominant American political culture and the social
transformative powers of their own culture."

20. The purpose of focusing on meaning is to shift the focus away from merely
understanding the legal import of a particular set of social relations or legislative or
judicial activity. In order to think about using law, that is to conceive of law functionally,
one must first think about law hermeneutically. To quote Clifford Geertz:
What will do? That, of course, is hard to say. But it will surely involve a shift
away from functionalist thinking about law - as a clever device to keep people
from tearing one another limb from limb, advance the interests of the dominant classes, defend the rights of the weak against the predations of the strong,
or render social life more predictable at its fuzzy edges (all of which it clearly

is, to varying extents at different times in different places); and a shift toward
hermeneutic thinking about it - as a mode of giving particular sense to particular things in particular places (things that happen, things that fail to, things
that might), such that these noble, sinister, or merely expedient appliances take
particular form and have particular impact. Meaning, in short, not machinery.
C. GEERTZ, supra note 3, at 232.
21. See, e.g., Frickey, Majority Rule, Minority Rights, and the Right to Vote:
Reflections Upon Reading of Minority Vote Dilution, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 209 (1985).
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I.
A.

CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES

22

The Foundations of Critical Legal Theory

CLS, like the work of the Realists, 23 is characterized by a thoroughgoing criticism and rejection of formalism. 24 Rejecting formalism in the law, however, is today a commonplace. 25 CLS moves beyond Realism by incorporating an attack on liberal theory as part of
the generalized critique of formalism. The Realists demonstrated
that legal doctrine and the tools of legal analysis cannot produce de-

terminant results, or results independent of the analyst. CLS goes
further by suggesting that the critique of formalism both in law and
in liberal social theory must include a rejection of "the rule of
law," 26 as well as a rejection of claims for any remaining viable distinction between legal reasoning and political discourse.27
In rejecting both legal formalism and liberal formalism, CLS has
articulated
an assault on what has come to be termed "liberal legalism. ' 28 Liberal legalism is the conflation of liberal social theory and
the legal justifications it has created that disguise and perpetuate
fundamental social contradictions. 9 Those contradictions are
masked by the discourse of the law and by the procedures that law
22. For a recent articulation of the "foundations of Critical Legal Studies," see
Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: An Introduction to Its Origins and Underpinnings,36 J,
LEGAL EDUC. 505 (1987).
23. Some have argued that, despite the claims of critical legal scholars, the connection between CLS and Legal Realism is more tenuous than widely assumed - that,
in fact, CLS may be "in complete and fundamental opposition" to the project of the
Realists. See Note, Critical Legal Studies as an Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 VA. L.
REV. 983 (1986); cf. Note, 'Round and 'Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism
to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 12.

25.

But cf. B.

ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW

(1984) (arguing

that the progressive task is a reconstruction of the American legal tradition); Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (defending formalism from general criticism and
positing a "presumptive formalism" as the "heart of the idea of law").

26. See THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY (A. Hutchinson & P. Monahan
eds. 1987); M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987) (particularly
chapter 8).
27. Critical legal theorists reject "the rule of law" as a separate analytical category, independent of its ideological function. Because the idea of "the rule of law" does
have a powerful ideological dimension, its role in the debate over the nature of legal
institutions must necessarily be self-consciously linked to the practical consequences of its
ideological role. Since legal debate is largely composed of attempts to persuade, resort to
"the rule of law" as a justification for a given outcome must be understood principally as
a rhetorical move intended to provide an indisputably "good" reason for supporting that
outcome. See R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM (1983). For a similar argument made in the context of "rights," see Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of

"Rights," 33 UCLA L. REV. 977 (1986).
FALO

28. See, e.g., Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFL. REV. 205 (1979).
29. See generally R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); R. UNGER,

LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY
MENT (1986).

(1976); R.

UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVE-
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provides to evade responsibility for the substantive choices that are
made and necessarily must be made. 30
According to critical legal theorists, the core of legal liberalism is
the conviction that law is fundamentally separate from other types of
social control, and that law consists of rules, and rules for manipulating those rules. This collection of rules both defines the proper
sphere of their own application and exists as objective, legitimate,
normative mechanisms. This constellation of beliefs allows law to be
viewed as an autonomous, objective (and hence legitimate) means of
mediating social disputes."1
The system of legalism described by these beliefs is one that is
predicated upon an individualized or atomized conception of society.
In such a conception of social life, disputes are resolved through an
objective ordering of "interests" which are crystallized as rights or
political entitlements. That system of rights separates the public
from the private sphere. The "rule of law" itself is used to keep the
state at bay. 2 To conceive of law this way is to recognize that the
law, as it reflects liberal theory, is based upon a distinction between
the public and the private, between the state and civil society, between self and other, between freedom and order. 3
CLS does not necessarily reject those contradictions. It merely rejects the "faith" that law provides any neutral, objective, or intrinsi-

cally just way of resolving either individual conflicts or the deeper
structural conflicts. The generalized critique of liberal legalism, and
the diagnosis of the inherent antimonies of liberal social theory, is
reflective of the continued critical rejection of the varieties of formalism extant in our law and social theory. It is also part of the analysis
of the hegemonic and legitimating function of law and legal
discourse.
According to critical legal theorists, one of the most pernicious
aspects of the dominance of liberal legalism is the invasive quality of
the ideology it contains, describes, and reproduces. The assumptions
30.

See generally Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L.

REV. 561 (1983); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973).

31. See Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections between Law and PoliticalScience, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968) (of particular
interest is the critique of Wechsler's concept of "neutrality.").
32. See, e.g., E. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK
ACT 258 (1975) (describing the practical content of the belief in "the rule of law"); cf.
Horwitz, The Rule of Law: An Unqualified Human Good? (Book Review), 86 YALE L.J.
561 (1977) (reviewing D. HAY, supra note 18 and E. THOMPSON, supra).
33. In liberal theory, these distinctions go back at least as far as Rousseau and
are found replicated in both positivism and natural law theories.
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which underlie traditional legal discourse are very much a part of

the ideology that dominates society.34 However, presented as part of

accepted legal doctrine, those assumptions are effectively removed
from the realm of naked power and are clothed with a solemnity and
neutrality which appears to have arisen either naturally or from the
imprimatur of a tradition beyond reproach. 5 Law operates, then, to
validate particular conceptions of society, both by dictating the kinds
of arguments that are persuasive within legal institutions and by legitimizing certain concrete social arrangements.36 Under this analysis, we are blind to the political functions the law performs, especially when those functions occur outside of the institutions we
regard as properly political. Indeed, the traditional perception of law
consists of a formalized notion of the proper scope of politics and a
complete rejection of the idea that law is fundamentally political.
The politics of law is expressed on many levels and through many
functions. Most pervasive is the ideological role that law plays in the
construction of popular consciousness and perception.37 To the extent
that law successfully fulfills this role, it is a politics without politics.
That is to say, legal consciousness38 provides the structure for conceptualizing political questions without itself being subject to the
34. There is the problem of defining ideology and keeping the use of ideology as
an analytic category distinct from other problems of methodology and epistemology. See
Stick, supra note 13, for a critique of the CLS approach to traditional legal discourse.
See also K. Harvey, supra note 19:
Cart-and-horse confusions notwithstanding, the relationship between a socially

specific ideology and epistemology deserves close attention. My own view of the
relationship has points of difference with both of those presented above, and
may be introduced, accurately if perhaps flippantly through two propositions:
People who differ in a violent or threatening manner with the dominant ideology of a society tend to wind up in jail; people who differ in a violent or threatening manner with the dominant epistemology of a society tend to wind up in
mental hospitals.
Id. at 17.
35. This hypothesis can be tested by looking at those places in the law where legal
values are subject to popular abuse or in those places where the question of values appears to be beside the point. MacKinnon demonstrates this in her treatment of the law of
rape and the jurisprudence of consent. See MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method
and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE &
Soc'Y 635 (1983).
36. See Taub & Williams, Will Equality Require More Than Assimilation, Accommodation or Separation From the Existing Social Structure?, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.
825 (1985); see also MacKinnon, supra note 35; MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN CULTURE &
Soc'Y 515 (1982) [hereinafter, MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory].
37. See, e.g., Kennedy, Toward a Historical Understandingof Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1880-1980, 3 RESOURCES IN L.
& Soc'Y 3 (1980); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RESOURCES IN L. & Soc'Y
25 (1980).
38. See Gabel, supra note 37; Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563 (1984); Kennedy,
supra note 37.
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limitations of politics. The formal neutrality at the foundation of legal discourse hides the distributive choices which are made. In this
way, law accomplishes political ends while effectively divorcing itself
from political means. Only those cases that threaten ingrained distri-

butional patterns are subject to charges of lawlessness. As discussed
later-, this process has led to the initial focus on civil rights as a
necessary precursor and proxy for other social claims. The distinction between law and politics has resulted in the current crisis in
race relations law and policy. Law provides both the means and form
of social union by eliding the deeper contradictions of a liberal social
construction. Law does not stand outside the process of legitimization, for it is both producer and product of the dominant social culture. Legal culture and institutions are, indeed, the clearest articulations of the reigning social vision and, thus, are important elements
in the function of both popular beliefs about commonplace relationships and popular acquiesence to the existing distribution of social
goods and power.3 9 In this construction, law is the mechanism for
legitimizing the existing hierarchy of social relations and, hence, for
crystallizing existing patterns of domination."
Most critical legal scholars reject Marxism to the extent that
traditional versions of Marxist jurisprudence partake of a "vulgar
instrumentalism" employing some form of base/super-structure or
phenomenal/epiphenomenal analysis. However, it is precisely this rejection of instrumentalism that has led to the focus on political and
cultural relations and concern for the process of legitimation." Here
the debt to Marxism is less obvious, but just as direct. Through reliance upon the work of the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School4 2
and the work of Antonio Gramsci,4" among others, critical legal theorists have relied on more refined Marxist conceptions in their attempt to understand the role of law in the development of hegemonic
39. Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegratingIdeals and Client Interests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1986); Karst, supra note 18.
40. See Lears, The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities,
90 Am. HIST. REV. 567 (1985) (discussing the problems raised by the works of Antonio
Gramsci. See SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMSCI (Q.

Hoare & G. Smith eds. 1971)).
41.

See J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS (1971); J. HABERMAS,

LEGITIMATION CRISIS

(1975).

42. "The Frankfurt School" and "critical theory" refer principally to the work
done at the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt (and abroad during exile) by Max
Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and Jurgen Habermas, along with a
constellation of others.
43. See Lears, supra note 40.
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control. CLS has used critical theory44 to formulate a conception of
the state that escapes the traditional state/civil society dichotomy
and to construct a theory which can be used to criticize social domination in all its forms.45
B. A "Critical" Review of the Law of Race Relations4
The easy analysis of the evolving law of race relations is that the

law has merely eliminated the overt expressions of legally permissi-

ble racism. From this perspective, the forms of racism that protect
white male prerogatives are submerged from view and have been insulated from the kinds of legal attacks that felled Jim Crow. Racism
is beyond the reach of law, even if its overt expression is at times
illegal and always in bad taste.47
A second, less cynical vision perceives law as providing the only
remedy for racial discrimination that is readily justifiable. Racism,
in this view, is the product of bad people exhibiting individual racial
animus. Provide remedies for the victims of racism and penalize
those people who discriminate and racism will disappear. Continued
discrimination will become inefficient because there will be nothing
to be gained socially or economically by continuing to discriminate
unfairly on the basis of race. 48 Racism is a purely individuated prob44. See generally A.

WELLMER, CRITICAL THEORY OF SOCIETY

(1971).

45. One fundamental problem with CLS is its failure to develop an adequate theory of the state. This failure has led to confusion in the discourse concerning the so-called
public/private distinction. See especially Mensch & Freeman, Liberalism's Public/Private Split, 3 TIKKUN 24 (1988).
46. The following section is based in large part upon the work of Professor Alan
Freeman, particularly A. Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw: A Critical Review, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 96 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law], and A. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination

Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, in
MARXISM AND LAW

210 (P. Beirne & R. Quinney eds. 1982) [hereinafter Freeman,

Legitimizing Racial Discrimination].
47. The caricatures which appear in this and subsequent paragraphs are included
purely for heuristic purposes. For fully developed iterations, see Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976);
Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brest,
The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword:In Defense of the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 90 HARV. L. REV.1 (1976); Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974); Downs, Racism in America and How to Combat

It, reprinted in D. BELL,

RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW

87 (1973); Fiss, School

Desegregation:The Uncertain Path of the Law, 4 PHIL. & PUB.AFF. 3 (1974); Fiss, The
Supreme Court, 1978 Term - Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976); Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1977); Posner, The De Funis Case and
the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV.

1; Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education. PoliticalResponsibility and

the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 653 (1975).
48. See Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Brokers and Title VIII, 85 YALE
L.J. 808 (1976) (arguing for extending Title VIII liability to real estate brokers who
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lem which one is capable of avoiding.
It is against these two perspectives that the response of critical
legal theory arises. Critical theory begins from the perspective that
racism is both an individual problem in its concrete expression and a
social problem in its generation. The continued effects of the history
of racism in this country - reduced opportunity for blacks as a
class, for example - occur with no individual ill will at all.49 Our
legacy is the historical subordination of various groups of people. Its
contemporary expression is the continued racially identifiable distribution of social resources. The effects of racism can continue despite
the best of individual intentions.
The actual legal response to racism in the United States has been
confused.50 The origin of the legal attacks on racial subordination in
the South, with its overt system of Jim Crow laws, 5 ' led to the focus
on results.52 If the schools were segregated, desegregate them. If the
bus station had two waiting rooms, eliminate them. If the state made
invidious distinctions on the basis of race, prohibit them. If deeds
contained racially restrictive covenants, refuse to enforce them. This
result-oriented jurisprudence was bound up in the notion that racism
is the product of a dysfunctional system, rather than of bad people.
Eradicating racism required the legal overhaul of a basically acceptable social mechanism.5"
Brown v. Board of Education54 was the classic expression of the

modern law of race relations. In Brown, the Supreme Court unanisteer minority clients toward non-white neighborhoods).
49. R.E. FRIEDMAN, InstitutionalRacism: How to Discriminate Without Really
Trying, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 384 (T. Pettigrew ed. 1975).
50. See Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 46, at 99.
51. See C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (rev. 2d ed. 1966).
52. Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 46, at 98.
53. Unfortunately, enough images of evil people surfaced during the civil rights
movement to reinforce the belief that eliminating the evildoers would eliminate the evil.
Equally problematic for the civil rights movement was the necessity of struggling against
a system of state-supported racial subordination. The state action doctrine, of course,
limited the constitutional attack on racism. See Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421; St. Antoine, Color Blindness but not Myopia: A New
look at State Action, Equal Protection,and "Private" Racial Discrimination,59 MICH.
L.REV. 993 (1961); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961).
Political realities also limited the frontal attack on racism to its state-sponsored manifestations. See C. WOODWARD, supra note 51; R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY
OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICANS' STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY

(1975). Thus, the initial struggle against racism contained the seeds of both a systemic
attack on racial subordination and the pacification of the attackers. Because the law both
drives and is driven by ideology, the predictable result of an expanded effort to eliminate
racism is a shift in the kind of remedies sought.
54. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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mously 55 rejected the established doctrine of "separate but equal,"
holding that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."" 6 The command in Brown was to desegregate the public
schools. This deceptively simple directive was quickly transmuted
into several abstract principles, proffered as appropriate legal justifications for so radical a shift in established legal doctrine. Professor
Wechsler argued that Brown was not about racial discrimination at
all, but turned on the notion of freedom of association. 5 7 Others contended that the decision reflected a basic belief in the value of a
color-blind society.5 8 A third perspective concluded that Brown effectively incorporated equality of educational opportunity into the equal
protection clause.59 The product of these various interpretations was
confusion for those charged with implementing Brown and perilously
increased expectations for those who found in the Court's opinion the
chance to hope that a dark era in American history was at an end.
The force of the opinion was clearly not limited by justifications
premised on freedom of association. The remedy prescribed was to

55. Much discussion has been generated concerning why the opinion had to be
unamimous. In Brown, the Court was thought to be playing an explicitly political role in
that it was not just declaring a particular action by a legislative body unconstitutional,
but was, in effect, redefining the polity. The political sensitivity of their action is what
necessitated the "all deliberate speed" action and what made Brown II politically necessary. See Deutsch, supra note 31, at 190-212 (explains the political role of the Court and

why the exercise of its judicial functions must be made in full congnizance of institutional pressures on the Court and the difficulty constitutional theory has in providing a
sufficient justification for different political cases); Interview with Philip Elman, former

law clerk to Justice Felix Frankfurter, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REV. 817
(1987); cf. Kennedy, A Reply to Philip Elman, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987); Elman,
Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987).

56. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.

57. H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principles of ConstitutionalLaw,
PLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 46-47 (1961).

in PRINCI-

58. See Kauper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1954); Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools:
The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 574-83 (1965). For contemporary

articulations of the "color-blind constitution" concept, see R. RoSSUM,

REVERSE DISCRIM& W. BENNETT,
127-28 (1979);
& W. BEANEY. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: INTRODUCTORY ESSAYS & SELECTED CASES 383 (5th ed. 1972); Alstyne,
INATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE 60-61
COUNTING BY RACE
A. MASON

(1980); T.

EASTLAND

-Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHI. L. REV.

775 (1979).
59. This view is reflected in the following statement of Chief Justice Earl Warren
in the Court's opinion:
In these days it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
Brown (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), represented a significant retreat from the strong
statement about the importance of equal educational opportunity found in Brown (I).
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integrate, not just to allow freedom of choice. 60 The ideal of colorblindness, however, is much more central to the motifs of the liberal
state. To the state, citizens should be ciphers, empty except for the
attributes all share equally. 6 ' This ideal would continue to arise in
the context of later racial discrimination cases, especially those involving claims of "reverse discrimination."62
A string of post-Brown decisions further increased expectations
about the nature of legal remedies to racial discrimination. In Griffin
v. County School District,e3 the Supreme Court refused to allow
Prince Edward County, Virginia, to establish a system of private,
segregated schools with state and local financing in place of its public schools. Rather than merely enjoining the county from financing
segregated public education disguised as a private venture, the Court
held that federal courts are sufficiently empowered both to mandate
desegregation and to order the continued operation of public schools.
Thus, Griffin created the impression that states were expected to
take affirmative steps toward establishing integrated public schools.
Two years later, the decisions in two education cases suggested
that discrimination remedies would henceforth be fashioned to correct existing discriminatory conditions. In Green v. County School
Board,6 4 the Court rejected a desegregation plan that allowed students to choose which of the county's public schools to attend. Finding that the plan failed to have any measurable effect upon school
segregation three years after its adoption, the Court concluded that
"the burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan
that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work
now."65 In Monroe v. Board of Commissioners," a similar plan,

which allowed the integrated results of rezoning to be undone

through voluntary student transfers, was also invalidated. Once
again, the Court emphasized the degree to which integration had
actually been achieved. In so doing, the Court created the impression
that current discriminatory conditions, rather than a history of purposeful discrimination, were the remediable wrong. Inasmuch as
60. See Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Gaston County v. United
States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
61. See infra notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text.
62. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1977); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law, supra note 46, at I01.
63. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
64. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
65. Id. at 439.
66. 391 U.S. 450 (1968).

1055

these cases mandated actual integration, they suggested "that the
absence of integration might be just as remediable in a jurisdiction
that had not previously been guilty of de jure segregation.""1
Throughout the post-Brown cases, the Court did not need to look
for an "evildoer." Racism was perceived as a systemic flaw, remediable by a change in the system rather than by meting out punishment
upon an identified perpetrator. The high-water mark of this resultoriented era came in Griggs v. Duke Power Company.68 In Griggs, a
company was accused of violating Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Acts in requiring a high school diploma and satisfactory scores on
two standardized tests for promotion from the company's lowest paying jobs. These low-paying jobs were held exclusively by blacks. The
company contended that it had imposed the education and test requirements in order to increase the overall "quality" of its
workforce, although it could not demonstrate that the requirements
were in any way related to job performance. The Court was thus
faced with an ostensibly neutral practice that operated to perpetuate
previous conditions of segregation.
In rejecting the company's arguments, the Court held that, under
Title VII, "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices."' 9 Further, the Court noted that "good intent or absence of discriminatory
intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and
are unrelated to measuring job capability." 70
In effect, Griggs recognized the perspective of individuals who suffer the burdens of an inherently discriminatory system - what Professor Freeman labels the "victim perspective. ' 71 To its victims,
Freeman argues, racial discrimination exists not as the isolated conduct of aberrant individuals, but, rather, as an entire set of economic, political, and social barriers that operate to confine the members of a given class to subservient positions within society.

Antidiscrimination law, in order to be effective, must then reach beyond the punishment of individual offenders toward the dismantling
and reordering of the structures of discrimination."2 This at least appeared to be the position adopted by the Court in Griggs. Rather
than focusing upon Duke Power Company's allegedly nondiscrimina-

67. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination,supra note 46, at 226.
68. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
69. Id. at 430.
70. Id. at 432.
71. Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw, supra note 46, at 97; Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination,supra note 46, at 211-12.
72.
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tory intentions, the decision targeted the actual conditions produced
by the education and test score requirements. What mattered was
not whether the company intended to relegate blacks to the most
menial positions, but that this was in fact the result.
By adopting the victim perspective in Griggs, the Court appeared
ready to disavow what Freeman terms the "perpetrator perspective."

The perpetrator perspective centered on the notion that racial discrimination is entirely an individual phenomenon that can and
should only be addressed through the identification and legal sanction of individual perpetrators. From this perspective antidiscrimination law ought not extend itself beyond providing relief to "actual"
victims of de jure, as opposed to merely de facto, segregation. Those
individuals who have avoided engaging in illegal racist behavior
while continuing to reap the benefits of a white, male-oriented society are exonerated from blame. Indeed, they are justified in proclaiming themselves unfairly burdened by legal remedies fashioned
to overcome existing conditions of racial concentration and segregation. One need look no further than the continued success of socalled "reverse discrimination" challenges to affirmative action programs to observe just how deeply the perpetrator perspective remains
embedded within contemporary race relations law.
To the optimistic observer, Griggs hinted that perhaps the Court
would not confine its result-oriented approach to Title VII cases, instead extending the victim perspective to equal protection challenges
as well. Just a month after Griggs, the Court appeared to do just
that. In Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenbergBoard of Education,73 the
Court validated a district-wide school desegregation plan that included cross-district busing. Admittedly, the language of the decision
reflects continued reverence for the perpetrator perspective, casting
about for specific state policies to identify as the cause of the demonstrated segregation. However, the broadly fashioned desegregation
plan actually upheld in Swann only makes sense if the legally cognizable injury is segregation itself, be it purposeful or not.
A shift in the focus of the Court from discriminatory motivation
to actual conditions of racial concentration and segregation was even
more clearly implied by Keyes v. School District Number One.74

Keyes upheld a school desegregation plan which involved the entire
city of Denver, Colorado, even though only a portion of the city's
public school system was found to have been intentionally segre73.

402 U.S. 1 (1971).

74.

413 U.S. 189 (1973).
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gated. While continuing in its fixation upon de jure segregation, the
Court proceeded to hold that evidence of some officially sanctioned
segregation might prove sufficient to justify a system-wide desegregation plan. Once again, the Court seemed to adopt the same victimoriented approach that it had in Griggs, validating a remedy that
made no distinction between de facto and de jure segregation.
Taken together, Griggs, Swann, and Keyes reasonably implied
that the future of antidiscrimination law lay in the actual eradication
of existing racial segregation. This, in turn, suggested the potential
for a more generalized shift in American jurisprudence away from
atomistic concepts of social relations toward a more system-oriented
vision, which perceived racism as woven within the very fabric of
American society, and, therefore, remediable only through a reordering of the existing social structure. So radical an alteration in race
relations law, however, was in large part dependent upon the Court's
willingness to extend the concept of remediable discrimination it
adopted in Griggs to the constitutional arena. Although Swann suggested that such an extension was indeed to take place, the Court's
1972 decision in Jefferson v. Hackney75 foreshadowed a far more
dismal future.
Jefferson involved allegations that the state of Texas was discriminating against non-white welfare recipients through its method of
distributing federal welfare funds. The state adopted a scheme in
which recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) were allowed a smaller percentage of their demonstrated
need than recipients of other forms of federal support. Despite evidence that this adversely affected non-white AFDC recipients while
benefiting the mostly white recipients of other forms of federal support, the Court refused to invalidate the distribution plan. Writing
for the majority, Justice Rehnquist dismissed Griggs in a footnote,
clearly implying that equal protection challenges to discriminatory
conditions would not succeed absent convincing evidence of an underlying discriminatory intent.
The Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley76 further undermined the hope that Griggs would not be confined to Title VII-based
challenges to employment discrimination. Despite finding extensive

de jure segregation in the Detroit public school system, the Court
prohibited the institution of a desegregation plan that called for consolidating Detroit's almost entirely black school district with surrounding, largely white suburban districts. In language indicative of
the perpetrator perspective, the Court concluded that "without an
interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitu-
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406 U.S. 535 (1972).

76.

418 U.S. 717 (1974).

[VOL. 25: 1043, 1988]

Local Knowledge, Local Color
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy." ' 77 Milliken thereby
sealed off the possibility of successfully challenging the undeniably
segregated results of "white flight" from the cities to outlying suburbs. This decision rendered "antidiscrimination law" all the more
irrelevant to the struggle against racial domination.
Any lingering hope that Griggs would be extended beyond the
context of Title VII was dashed by Washington v. Davis.78 In Washington v. Davis, the Court expressly held that the Title VII and constitutional standards for adjudicating discrimination claims are not
identical. Davis involved an equal protection challenge to a pre-employment examination administered to potential police cadets by the
District of Columbia. Evidence was introduced demonstrating that
four times as many black as opposed to white candidates failed the
examination. However, the failure of the plaintiffs to adduce an
overt discriminatory motive behind the test was sufficient to convince
the Court that a remediable constitutional violation did not exist.
The more probing level of scrutiny called for in Griggs, requiring
that any employment practice resulting in racially disadvantaging
conditions be justified regardless of the motivation underlying it, was
replaced by presumed validity where no "smoking gun" of discriminatory intent could be found. The notion that discriminatory effects
standing alone constitute a remediable injury was, and today remains, confined to hiring practices attacked under Title VII.79
Despite the limitations the Court constructed around the rationale
in Griggs, the Court did, in effect, adopt the entire argument of the
civil rights litigators up to that point, even if it did not do so in the
context of a constitutional claim. Understanding the reality represented by the victorious argument in Griggs is important for a critical analysis of the shift in the structure of successful claims following Griggs and for understanding why the arguments came to grief
in Milliken v. Bradleys0 and, ultimately and resoundingly, in Washington v. Davis."l The shift does not reflect a change in the material
reality of the injury. It does reflect a change in the legitimacy of
77. Id. at 745.
78. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

79. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
80. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
81.

426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court's decision in Watson, supra note 79, suggests

that Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), will continue to be applied only in
Title VII-employment discrimination cases challenging hiring or promotion criteria and
will not trigger quotas as a court imposed remedy or as a self-imposed restriction to avoid
litigation.
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those claims and in the ideological presuppositions underlying the
structure of a successful, that is, persuasive antidiscrimination
argument.
The ideology that drives society82 affects how claims are perceived
and how the law will accommodate those claims. Where there is no
cognizable injury there will be no relief. What we have witnessed
through these cases is not that the particular injuries were rendered
invisible, but that the force of the claim for relief is diminishing
through the generalization of the injury. If we have all been injured
in a particular way, or if we are all capable of being injured in that

way, then the relief a court must fashion will be one that will be
limited by the logic of the injury. 83 Griggs represented a recognition
by the Supreme Court of the legitimacy of the perspective of the
person who has felt the violation. 4 That the violation affects a class
of persons does not diminish or dilute the experiential impact on the
particular plaintiff. We are seeing the reverse of this phenomenon in
the so-called "reverse discrimination" claims. However, the claims of
discrimination and reverse discrimination, while superficially logically equivalent, are substantively quite distinct. As one commentator recently noted: "Reverse discrimination is discrete and does not
follow the affected individual into her other endeavors, whereas original discrimination is symptomatic of widespread social attitudes
that have affected minority individuals in varying degrees at all
stages of their lives."85 Unfortunately, a claim of reverse discrimination in this context is just as powerful as the claim of racial or ethnic
subordination.
II.

USING CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY

TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF CULTURE

By using, developing, and refining concepts like hegemony in pursuit of an understanding of the processes of legitimation and validation, CLS has moved the critique of liberal legalism into a more generalized critique of culture. This is necessarily so, since "the concept
of culture is at the heart of the conception of consciousness as conscious existence, in which consciousness is seen both as bound up
with the existing state of affairs and as a condition which makes it
82. "Society" denotes the mass of people who share a particular culture, including the rules they adopt for sorting out complex and competing claims to social resources.
83.

See C. MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 1-13.

84. For a discussion of the evolution of the victim perspective in a different context, see C. MAcKINNON, supra note 8, at 1-9, 101-143; C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 103-16 (1987).
85. Walthew, Affirmative Action and the Remedial Scope of Title VII: Procedural Answers to Substantive Questions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 625, 647 (1987) (footnotes
omitted).
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possible to change that state of affairs." 86 Put another way, culture
provides the meaning of and reason for social action. Thus, the role
of law in changing the meaning of social action is central to material
transformation and to the possibility of imagining a social transformation. The development of a critique of culture holds the most
promise for integrating the academic and theoretical work of CLS
with the work of progressive practitioners.8s A cultural interrogation
of the law yields insight into the meaning of law rather than insight
only into its function. Fully understanding the meaning of law logically precedes articulating a functional prescription for the use of
law as a tool of social transformation.
Culture can be defined broadly as the whole way of life of a society. That whole way of life is comprised of the "learned repertory of
thoughts and actions exhibited by members of social groups - repertories transmissible independently of genetic heredity from one
' Law functions as a part of that complex
generation to the next."88
repertory. Its social relationship to the other factors that comprise a
culture is problematic. However, that general conception does allow
for the further refinements necessary to investigate and include "subcultures" within society. Distinct subcultures not only comprise another "whole way of life," but, to the extent that they represent challenges to the dominant culture, they also hold the potential for the
development of alternative social visions. If the legitimating function8 of the law is central to its ideological role in a liberal society,
then an investigation into the role of culture in the transmission of
legal consciousness is both theoretically and practically central.
This hopeful view must be tempered by a realization that "subcul86. W. OUTHWAITE, Culture, in A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 104-10
(T. Bottomore ed. 1983).
87. The rubric of "progressive practitioners" used here includes other "cultural
workers." The term "culture workers," though subject to some skepticism, adequately
conveys the notion of people involved in self-conscious political transformation. Hence,
not only lawyers, but all those who work with law in an attempt to transform culture are
legal "practitioners." This includes law teachers, for whom law creates an opportunity to
participate in social transformation.
88. M. HARRIS, CULTURAL MATERIALISM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A SCIENCE OF
CULTURE 47 (1979). There are difficulties with both broad definitions of culture. Indeed,
both seem behaviorist in origin, but more clearly defining the relationship between law
and the creation of culture is an important task for progressive lawyers. This necessarily
requires a better definition of just what "culture" is. Through a better understanding of
culture, we can begin to move beyond merely functional definitions of law.
89. M. KELMAN, supra note 26, at 262-95; see also Stick, Book Review, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 407, 417-32 (1988); Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WIs. L. REV. 379 (1983).
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tures" are exactly that: cultural groups that are beneath or within a
dominant cultural structure. Subcultures then are also subject to the
hegemonic domination of the larger society; that is, members of that
subculture are not free, by virtue of their membership in an identifiable and self-consciously separate group, to make their own future
independent of the larger cultural and social structure within which
they exist and function. Members of a self-conscious subculture,
through identification with their group, are able to construct and
identify a place within the larger society that provides a relatively
autonomous sphere within which social life is lived and created, even
if primary identification remains with the subgroup. 90 It is here that
issues of class, race, gender, and ideology are refracted and meaning
is changed from the conventional understandings that underlie the
premises of the dominant culture.. It is here, as well, that the external aspect of "what law means" is perhaps most pronounced, because here there is a double translation occurring.
III.

CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY AND THE LIBERATING POTENTIAL
OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

Culture might also be more narrowly (but only slightly more narrowly) defined as that set of shared understandings, whether consciously held or not, which makes it possible for a group of people to
act in concert with one another.9 ' These shared understandings are
reflected as much or more in the way life is lived, as in any conscious
articulation of cultural solidarity. 92 Thus, any viable subculture is
necessarily going to be fluent (as expressed in action) in the cultural
cues of the dominant society, whether those cues reflect the underlying values of that subculture or not. Where there is a failure of
translation or where there is a profound conflict between the values
90. The ideology of cultural nationalism does not have to exist for this statement
to be true. This is something like the role feminism has played in creating a new way of
understanding the role and condition of women in society. Feminism has contributed to
an emergence of a "new way of appreciating reality." See FEMINISM As CRITIQUE: ON
THE POLITICS OF GENDER (S. Benhabib & D. Cornell eds. 1987).
91. This definition is a paraphrase of one proffered by Professor Errol Meidinger
in Meidinger, Regulatory Culture: A Theoretical Outline, 9 LAw & POL'Y 355, 359
(1987). Professor Meidinger's approach validates some of the author's perspectives on
the path of CLS. A definition of culture as "shared understandings" may be characterized and criticized as a "consent-based" notion; however, that gloss on the proffered definition applies a degree of volition which is unnecessary. A "consciously held" understanding need not be "consciously chosen."
92. See id. In fact, it might be argued (and likely is somewhere) that a full articulation of the "shared understandings" that make up a culture is impossible and that
articulation itself makes these "understandings" less powerful or more easily avoided or
denied altogether. One exception may be the cultural development of feminism, which
uses consciousness-raising as a method of both theoretical development and cultural development and solidarity. See, e.g., MacKinnon, An Agenda for Theory, supra note 36.
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or understanding of the dominant culture and the subculture, that
disjunction will be expressed either through some form of situational
accommodation or through the marginalization of the subculture and
its members. 93 This marginalization may take many forms. 94 However, some discontinuity is necessary for the continued integrity of

the subculture.

5

The social meaning of that continued integrity is

what is at the heart of the law of race relations.
Incongruence between culture and subculture provides the window

for assessing the relationship of law to cultural formation and to the
development, maintenance, and creation of the structure of social relations generally. Comparing the structure of meaning within the

dominant culture with that of a subculture allows the identification
of the means by which legal consciousness is transmitted across cultures and across generations, as well as the identification of the ways

in which law and legal meaning change. "Local law" thus takes on a
specifically cultural meaning. The relationship of law to culture provides the chance to test provisional theories of legitimation and hege-

monic domination. The most promising place to construct theories
about the relationship of law and culture is the law of race relations. 6 The jurisprudence of race relations most clearly exposes the
structure of economic and racial dominance and its accommodation
to changing values in a generally liberal culture. This body of law
also exposes the significant difference in meaning that the accommodation has been given by white society and by the subordinate cul93. Often there will be both. See Torres, Teaching and Writing: Curriculum Reform as an Exercise in Critical Education, 10 NOVA L.J. 867, 875 (1986); Torres &
Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4 LAW &
INEQUALITY 171 (1986); Torres & Morales, Todo Se Paga: Richard Rodriguez's Hunger of Memory (Book Review), 7 CHICANO L. REv. 125 (1984); but cf. R. RODRIGUEZ,
HUNGER OF MEMORY: THE EDUCATION OF RICHARD RODRIGUEZ, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY

(1982).
94. See Developments in the Law L. REV. 1472 (1988).

Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV.

95. Perhaps this is best illustrated by the ways in which white ethnic groups ac-

commodate themselves to the dominant culture. The celebration of St. Patrick's Day, for
example, is actually an expression of the extent to which the Irish have been assimilated
into the dominant culture, rather than an expression of "separateness." Of course, this
observation is made from an external perspective. Irish people may well experience themselves as separate, but there is no clear material expression of that separateness in American culture. This is not to deny white ethnics their ethnicity; however, their ethnicity is
not a factor in general social relations, nor does it have, in most instances, an intersubjective component. Likewise, chicanos will both win and lose when the mayor of New York
City displays a "Kiss Me, I'm Mexican" button on the Fifth of May.
96. Professor Roy Brooks explores the evolution of the jurisprudence of race in
the context of American class structure in a forthcoming book, R. Brooks, Race and
Class: A Civil Rights Critique (unpublished manuscript on file with the author).
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tures within that society. A clear understanding of the relationship
between law and culture is necessary for constructing new legal
strategies to attack concrete manifestations of racism and its system
of legitimation.
It is difficult to underestimate the role of "civil rights" law or
"anti-discrimination" law or "the law of race relations" on transforming the beliefs and class structure of contemporary American
culture. Even the choice of terms used to characterize the legal
struggle against racism reveals particular conceptions of law and social relations. The vogue of a particular characterization is tied to
the particular legal strategies used for attacking racial
subordination.
The civil rights law characterization betrays a conception of the
conflict as one involving the right to participate in civil society, in
short, to be a citizen in the Athenian sense.97 That conception is the
genesis of the formal equality
limitation that is at the core of the
"antidiscrimination" view.98 The "law of race relations" crystallizes
the view of law as fundamentally a tool of management that sits
outside or beyond the political struggles that make up "race relations." The "law of race relations" formulation does, however, best
capture the notion that there are distinct sets of rules that govern the
general social relations of the "races," and that individual racial relations are governed by this matrix of rights, duties, and obligations.
That characterization also suggests that there are mutual rights, duties, and obligations being balanced in a neutral and objective way
and thus validates the removal of evolving race relations from their
97. ARISTOLE, POLITICS 1.1.10 (Loeb Classical Library ed. 1932).
98. The antidiscrimination view has fostered a reinvigoration of the color-blindness principle as a device for limiting the reach of race-conscious, group-based remedies.
See, e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The dissent by Justice Douglas
demonstrates the tension inherent in this area as well as the tension bound up in attempting to understand or make claims related to cultural pluralism:
The Equal Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not
their creation in order to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized. The purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce
black lawyers for blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews,
Irish lawyers for Irish. It should be to produce good lawyers for Americans and
not to place First Amendment barriers against anyone ....

[However] [t]he

melting pot is not designed to homogenize people, making them uniform in

consistency. The melting pot as I understand it is a figure of speech that depicts the wide diversities tolerated by the First Amendment under one flag.
Id. at 334 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Compare Justice Blackmun's opinion in Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke:
I suggest that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative-action program
in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask this be so is to demand
the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we
must treat them differently. We cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.
438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978).
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deeply historical context.
An interesting study done by Professor Thomas Pettigrew reveals
that the formal lessons of the legal struggle against racism have been
learned." He argues that:
Ambivalence, denial, even guilt all act to cause modern antiblack prejudice
to be expressed in increasingly indirect and subtle forms. Three such forms
are: indirect micro aggressions against blacks, avoidance of face-to-face interaction with blacks, and opposition to racial change for ostensibly nonracial reasons. Survey evidence suggests that opposition to racial change for
apparently nonracial reasons is a widespread expression of modern
prejudice. As noted, white Americans overwhelmingly reject blatant forms
of discrimination.
6 sing the older model of direct racial bigotry, one could dismiss such
U
contradictions by arguing that the large majorities who oppose abstract discrimination are simply giving lip service to the new norms but do not really
mean what they say

. .

. [T]his old-style interpretation misses the essence

of modern prejudice. There is considerable evidence for accepting these survey data largely at face value: whites do oppose both blatant discrimination
and concrete remedies to correct them. This apparent contradiction is fueled by subjective threat and shaped by a particular conception of opportunity in America. 100

This data seems to support the legitimating function hypothesis in

the theory of legal consciousness and ideology developed by CLS.' 0 '
The law of race relations as it has developed over the past twenty-

five years, but especially in the past fifteen, encapsulates precisely
the vision captured by Pettigrew. 102
The remedies provided by the legal attacks on racial domination

have been the kind which would yield a "subjective threat" to working-, lower-middle-, and lower-class whites. The remedies appear to
provide for racial discrimination by the courts. The dismantling of
the Jim Crow laws and the overt system of racial subordination 0 a
99.

37

Pettigrew, New Patternsof Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964,
L. REV. 673 (1985).

RUTGERS

100. Id. at 690-91.
101.

See Freeman, AntidiscriminationLaw, supra note 46; Freeman, Legitimizing

Racial Discrimination,supra note 46. For a critique of cultural hegemony as manifest in
the legal scholarship surrounding the law of race relations, see Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar, supra note 1.
102.

See Greene, Twenty Years of Civil Rights: How Firm a Foundation?, 37
America, in THE POLITICS OF
Freeman, Legitimizing Racial
Discrimination,supra note 46.
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1985); Burns, Law and Race in
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 89 (D. Kairys ed. 1982);

103. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (racially restrictive residential ordinance declared unconstitutional); Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(prohibiting state enforcement of racially restrictive covenants); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state mandated segregation of public education held unconstitutional); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (leasing of
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eliminated official badges of inferiority without implicating the basic
individualized "conception of opportunity," until the various forms
of affirmative action were instituted as a fundamental policy for remedying racial imbalance. The notion that racial imbalance is the
harm to be remedied is tied to the remedial structure of the early
law of race relations.104 Affirmative action, on the other hand, especially where it is separated from proof of specific or intentional discrimination, must be justified by reference to the historical subordination of blacks (or in some instances Hispanics and women). This
challenges the fundamental belief that we are not responsible for our
history.
One of the pervasive myths of American culture is that each generation creates the world anew. Children are presumed to be offered
the chance for "a better future." The extant distribution of social
goods, the context into which we are born and out of which we lead
our lives, is thought to reflect merely good or bad luck, not a material system of domination and subordination. The developing law of
race relations had to challenge that belief directly yet preserve its
hopeful content. Once Jim Crow was vanquished, the possibility of
providing a compelling justification removed from social, as opposed
to individual, conditions became quite problematic.
The popular views recorded by Pettigrew have their analog in the
law, the sophistication of their expression notwithstanding. In education, Swann 10 5 and Keyes'08 ordered the dismantling of segregated
school systems because they harmed the educational opportunities of
minority school children. Yet, the moral force of those decisions was
mitigated by Milliken, 07 which declared that the harm stopped at
the school district line. Sweatt v. Painter"8 and Brown, 109 which declared that the state could deprive neither black adults nor children
of public education and said that the state educational resources
must be redistributed, were resolved into Bakke."' Bakke held that
the state may take race into account in admitting students to public
schools, but that the state may not, self-consciously, take its racial
government owned facility to private operators sufficient state action to require desegregated operation); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (com-

merce clause justification for application of civil rights law requiring provision of lodgings without regard to race); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§
1982 of Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
property).
104. See Smith, Alternatives to Paralysis: A Working Paper Precipitatedby the
Affirmative Action Cases, 61 OR. L. REv. 317 (1982).
105. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
106. Keyes v. School Dist. Number One, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
107. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
108. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
109. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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history into account. In employment, Griggs"' declared that private

employers may not interpose burdens unrelated to job performance
in order to keep the workplace segregated, but Washington v. Davis"' said that the Constitution imposed no such requirement. The

reasoning supporting the affirmative action plan approved in
Weber 1 " was rejected in Stotts. n 4 It is just this movement in the
law that minority and critical legal scholars have captured so profoundly," 5 even as traditional scholars have ably predicted where the

law would go as they offered prescriptions for change."' Each faction has charted the path of the law. Despite this, there has been
little fruitful communication between them."'

Yet, despite the incorporation of the gains of the legal struggle for
racial equality into the mainstream of legal ideology and the use of
those gains for the legitimation of an ahistorical individualized conception of social life, the law was used to effect concrete, material

(and ideological) gains for traditionally subordinated groups, even
though it did not change the fundamental character of that subordination. While some critics dismiss these gains as the mere "em-

bourgeoisification" of a small number of blacks and other minorities
in order to gain social peace," 8 the access of those communities to a
greater share of the social product leads not only to the assimilation-

ist choice - the wholesale adoption of the dominant norms (and
styles) - but also creates the material conditions for those subcul11l.Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
112. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); cf.Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
113. United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
114. Firefighters Local Number 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
115. See D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (1973); SHADES OF BROWN
(D. Bell ed. 1980); Bell, Strangers in Academic Paradise: Law Teachers of Color in
Still White Schools 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 385 (1986); Brooks, Civil Rights Scholarship:A
ProposedAgenda for the Twenty-First Century, 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 397 (1980); Crenshaw,
supra note 1; Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note 1; Lawrence, The Id,the Ego,
and Equal Protection. Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317
(1987); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987); Moran, Commentary: The Implications of Being a
Society of One, 20 U.S.F.L. REV. 503 (1986); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
116. See Brest, supra note 47; Ely, supra note 47; Fiss, supra note 47; Sandalow,
supra note 47.
117. See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar, supra note I at 577; O'Neil, A Reaction
to "The Imperial Scholar" and Profesor Delgado's Proposed Solution, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 255, 258 (1985).
118. See, e.g., R. RODRIGUEZ, supra note 93; Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law,
supra note 46, at 110.
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tures to remain viable even as they are changed.' 19
Perhaps the most significant product of the legal victories is their
capacity to create a space for cultural pluralism. 120 To the extent
that subcultures retain their vitality they contain the potential for
new social visions. This vision will define the subculture as part of
the dominant society even if not a thoroughly homogenized part of
the dominant culture. One of the tensions that continues to exist in
the structure of traditional American pluralism is the tension between the political and ethnic definitions of American culture. The
evolution of modern race relations law has promised that the civic
definition of equality includes the rejection of an ethnic definition of
American culture or, at minimum, a rejection of an ethnic definition
that presumptively excludes the historically excluded and subordinated. That promise is that the path to belonging is one that must be
trodden by both the dominant and subordinate groups.
The significance of the ideological changes wrought by the legal
struggle against racism is that even as the remedies for historical

racial domination are rejected, the legitimacy of that domination is
weakened. The destruction of the legitimacy of blatantly racist behavior suggests a cultural accommodation that permits the subordinated groups to see their future defined in terms of liberation rather
than mere equality.' 2 ' The power of that internal subcultural ideological transformation allows the average person of color to understand the social content of substantive rather than formal equality.
The formal equality conundrum which plagues the law does not exist
in this formulation since social equality consists of more than either
logical or civic equality. Thus Bakke, for example, represents a reaction to the efforts of historically subordinate groups to develop a
strategy of independence. As Dean Bell, among others, has reported,122 Brown may stand for integration in some circles, but integration stands merely as proxy for a legitimate claim to a greater
share of social goods. 23
119. See Wilson, The DecliningSignificance of Race, in R. Brooks, supra note 96,
120. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 47; see also Comment, Cultural Pluralism, 13
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1978).
121. "Mere equality" is here defined as the opportunity to be just like the dominant group.
122. Bell, supra note 39, at 471; C. Lawrence, One More River to Cross-Recognizing the Real Injury in Brown: A Prerequisiteto Shaping New Remedies, in SHADES OF
BROWN 49 (D. Bell ed. 1980); Professor Kujovich demonstrates just this point by highlighting the pressure that desegregation has placed upon the ability of black schools to
redefine their role in service to the black community and to secure the material resources
to continue serving a black constituency. See Kujovich, Equal Opportunity in Higher
Education and the Black Public College: The Era of Separate But Equal, 72 MINN. L.
REv. 29 (1987).

123. There is an explanation for this difference in perception. The explanation goes
to the heart of what things mean. There must be a greater understanding of what legal
changes mean to those other than the parties litigating. That particular legal decisions
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As suggested earlier, one fruitful way of analyzing the law of race
relations is not just in terms of its legitimating function, but in terms
of the development of the necessary conditions of existence for viable
cultural alternatives. These alternatives represent the potential to un-

derstand the relationship between the overall structure of social life
and the particular elements of that structure. If subcultures are, like

the law, both the product and producer of the general social structure, then understanding how culture functions will tell us much
about how law functions in the creation of consciousness.
Additionally, the emergence of alternative cultural norms and so-

cial visions informs our understanding of how rights function within
the legal system, 2 as well as our understanding of the evolution of a
type of collective right. This occurs even as the courts have tried to

reduce the remedies for racial subordination to individual rights.125
The law of race relations also reveals that rights discourse ought not
to be completely abandoned, even though it can be demonstrated

that rights are inherently incoherent. 12 6 Thus, the evolution of the
law of race relations exposes a kind of dialectical tragedy in the use
of the law to create the capacity for alternative cultural futures.
Even as challenges to the dominant cultural prerogatives exist, legal
stand for more than the discrete issue in dispute is what accounts both for the role of
legal decisions as precedent and for their existence as a cultural symbol. To that extent,
then, every legal change that is able to be concretely represented is a sign in the Peircean
sense. That is, it is something that stands for something else. Understanding and identifying that "something else" is critical for deciding what to do next. There are a number
of things that a particular decision or series of decisions can stand for; their meaning
depends upon who interprets them and for what purpose. The interpretation results in
complex material differences. Thus, a decision to open up the public school to black
schoolchildren may "mean" that a state cannot discriminate on the basis of race in the
provision of public services. It may also "mean" that black people no longer have to
accept that which a white-dominated state will give them. See E. GENOVESE, ROLL JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974).
Similarly, the so-called "black English" case, Martin Luther King, Jr. Elementary
School Children v. Ann Arbor School Dist., 473 F. Supp. 1371 (E.D. Mich. 1979), was
not a demand that everyone be taught in a non-standard or subliterate version of English.
Rather, it was a demand that educators recognize that blacks had developed a language
of their own. Thus, the remedy in that case is instructive: teach the teachers about the
language so that they might respect the students who speak it. The change in how the
language is understood is necessarily tied to a change in attitudes toward the speakers.
For a fuller description of the sign, indexical, and iconic function of legal decisions, see
R. KEVELSON, THE LAW AS SYSTEM OF SIGNS 1-13 (1988) (discussing the application of
the Peircean taxonomy to law).
124. See Williams, supra note 115.
125. See Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1417 (1984); Schneider, The

Dialectic of Rights and Politics:Perspectives From the Woman's Movement, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 589 (1986).

126.

See Crenshaw, supra note 1.
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remedies create the potential for the assimilation of subcultures. Assimilation means cultural elimination. Yet, failure to grasp the offer
of assimilation means that members of a subculture must continue to
endure varieties of nativist attacks, calls for English to be made the
official language, and other gratuitously antagonistic gestures. 2 7 The
role of critical legal theory must be to change the understanding of
the bargain which must be struck.

127. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 6, declaring English the official state language;
Karst, supra note 47.
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